liberalism is not necessarily the "sovereign secularism" that the West (including Germany) now experiences.
After this chapter explicitly engaging with the German context, chapter 5, "'Paleothomism?'-The Continuing Debate over the Natural Desire for the Vision of God," responds to John Milbank's "Bulgakovian reading of de Lubac's theology" (131), at the bottom of which, in my view, Hütter senses the monistic vision of Hegel. Here Hütter again critiques the Nietzschean/postmodern style of modern theological discourse according to which theology "can only be conceived as defensible and intelligible in a thoroughly historical-contextualist and constructivist mode" so that " [t] he only way to forward arguments is by situating and out-narrating opponents as well as offering rhetorical and aesthetic appeals leading to the volitional as well as conceptual conversion of the interlocutor" (137). Anyone familiar not only with Nietzsche but also with theology influenced by German critical theory (or even, from a different angle, with the theology of Hütter's Duke teacher and colleague, Stanley Hauerwas) will resonate with Hütter's depiction of the current scene: "Propositional discourse as informed by metaphysical realism and discursive, conceptual argumentation is therefore at present widely dismissed as a suspiciously disembodied and philosophically outmoded mode of speculative theology, oblivious to the historical, pragmatic, and practice-oriented nature of theology itself and thus vulnerable to being constantly co-opted by deeply entrenched as well as concealed discourses of power and interest" (137). Chapter 5 additionally finds Hütter contesting the way in which Karl Barth lays speculative groundwork for universal apokatastasis, although Hütter allows that "universal human salvation remains a legitimate theological expression of the infused, supernatural virtues of hope and charity and hence a matter of fervent prayers of intercession, as consistently argued by Hans Urs von Balthasar" (181).
Chapter 6, "'Thomist Ressourcement'-A Rereading of Thomas on the Natural Desire for the Vision of God," should be read as a companion piece to chapter 5. Rather than ruling out a natural desire for the vision of God, Hütter affirms it-though not a natural desire for the supernatural-along the creative and controversial lines set forth in 1950 by the Dominican, Marie-Joseph Le Guillou, who explicitly sought a middle ground between Henri de Lubac's Surnaturel and those who attacked it most strongly. Chapter 7, "'Thomas the Augustinian'-Recovering a Surpassing Synthesis of Grace and Free Will," moves back in time to address Martin Luther on the issue of grace and free will. Hütter argues that Aquinas achieves a vision that, by means of philosophical analysis of divine and human non-competitive causality, enables us to avoid Luther's view that humans are not free in relation to God. In chapter 8, "'In Hope He Believed Against Hope'-The Unity of Faith and Hope in Paul, Thomas, and Benedict XVI," Hütter again takes up Luther, this time through the writings of Pope Benedict XVI (Joseph Ratzinger). In Spe Salvi, Benedict XVI challenges Luther's translation of Hebrews 11:1. Luther interprets this crucial verse on faith as a description of our own subjective stance or firmness, rather than a description of an objective reality given to us. Hütter supports Benedict XVI's approach via a retrieval of Aquinas's teaching about faith and hope.
In Chapter 9, "'A Forgotten Truth?'-Theological Faith, Source and Guarantee of Theology's Inner Unity," Hütter addresses the nature of theological faith and the nature of theology through a brilliant critique of Walter Kasper's 1967 The Methods of Dogmatic Theology. He observes that, for Kasper, indebted to the later Schelling and the later Heidegger, "[b] ecause there is no perennial supernatural given of the faith, there can be no contemplation of the faith that rises above the flux of history toward God" (329). Chapter 10, "'The Wisdom of Analogy Defended'-From Effect to Cause, from Creation to God," defends the balance and fruitfulness of Aquinas's account of the analogy of being (as interpreted especially by Bernard Montagnes) through an exposition of the contradictory criticisms lodged against it by two major German Lutheran theologians: Wolfhart Pannenberg's charge that the analogy of being anthropomorphizes God through univocity, and Eberhard Jüngel's charge that the analogy of being makes God utterly unknowable through equivocity. In Pannenberg, Hütter finds "metaphysical conceptualism with its strong Hegelian undertones," whereas he notes that "Jüngel, by mistaking Thomas for Cajetan-read in turn through Kant-reduces Thomas's way of analogical predication to conception proportionality," so as to turn the analogy of being into "merely . . . a mentally immanent system of comparison" (382).
Chapter 11, "'Seeking Truth on Dry Soil and under Thornbushes'-God, the University, and the Missing Link: Wisdom," constitutes a nuanced and constructive critique of the modern research university, based as it is upon the German model established in the nineteenth century. Hütter begins this chapter with Pope Benedict XVI's 2006 address to the University of Regensburg, where Benedict depicted the true university as necessarily inclusive of theology. Despite its natural orientation to the transcendent, human reason that lacks the contribution of theology becomes truncated, instrumentalized, and frag-mented. In the same chapter, Hütter underlines yet again his critique of "post-metaphysical" theology, which in his view inevitably opens the door to "deficient understandings of God, what it is to be human, and the world as created 'all the way down'" (414). He contrasts Benedict Ashley's insistence upon reason's ability to apprehend the transcendent with Kant's reduction of reason's scope to the level of the phenomenal. Rather than completely rejecting the German research model, Hütter-much as he does for "genuine liberalism"-has an affirmative word for the goods offered by the German university in its ideal form: "Ashley's approach and agenda seem more capable to accommodate the modern, Berlin-type research university with its ideal of an integral unity between research and teaching. . . . For Ashley can acknowledge the modern research university as the great-grandchild of Aristotle's comprehensive program of research, from whence Ashley also sees arising the very potential for internal reform" (416).
In his final chapter, titled "'This Is My Body'-Eucharistic Adoration and Metaphysical Contemplation," Hütter focuses on transubstantiation, set forth in light of his experience of participating in Eucharistic adoration in the diocese of Raleigh, North Carolina. Though he does not mention it explicitly, the presence of Luther's insistence upon consubstantiation inevitably looms large for any reader who has been paying attention up to this point.
The connections with German theology and the German context that I have highlighted might seem to paint Hütter's book in a reductionary way, as though his theology could be reduced to biography, which it most certainly cannot. Thus we should recall the significance of German theology and philosophy for all theology-and especially all Catholic theology-done in the United States today. No Catholic theology in the United States today could be imagined that does not deal in some way with Ratzinger, von Balthasar, Rahner, Kasper, and even Barth and Pannenberg-to say nothing of Nietzsche, Adorno, Heidegger, Hegel, Schelling, and Kant. Hütter's work, thus, is as fully American as it is rooted in the German context. Indeed, it is a much better contribution precisely to the American context, precisely because of its intimate and multi-sided knowledge of the German context. Given Hütter's effort to retrieve Aquinas's philosophical theology in dialogue with German philosophy and theology, a predictable question should be addressed: is Hütter's insistence upon the value of Thomas Aquinas a repetition of Leo XIII's attempt to replace modern German philosophy with Aquinas's metaphysics and epistemology, cast as the philosophia perennis? Put more plainly, given the implicit meaning that such a question typically bears, in my experience, has Hütter become reactionary and defensive in his post-conversion theological path? The answer (obviously) is no, for a twofold reason. First, Hütter's engagement with German scholarship needs to be read through his nuanced presentations of genuine liberalism and the university, and especially through the crucial function that Ratzinger/Benedict XVI plays throughout the book as the representative of salutary Catholic theology today. For Hütter, a Thomistic contribution is not here opposed to the insights of the nouvelle théologie and the contributions of the modern world. Second, rather than a reactionary defensiveness, a deep optimism about human capacities and human destiny-and even about the potential of modern politics and universities-courses through this book, without detriment to Hütter's awareness of the dire consequences of human sin.
Consider Hütter's critique throughout of an all-too-commonplace agonistic theology that depends solely upon "rhetorical and aesthetic appeals" due to its inability, having jettisoned metaphysical and dogmatic realism, to defend truth about God and creation. In fact, Hütter's critique works not primarily in a negative direction, but in a way that aims to highlight a highly positive account of reason's capacities. In chapter 2, in which Hütter defends reason's wondrous capacity to obtain real knowledge of God, this positive view of reason does not lead Hütter to minimize the need for revelation or to neglect the need for the conversion of the will for the attainment of knowledge of God. Hütter's optimistic anthropology is rooted appropriately in a strong sense of the will's fallenness and its important role in reasoning. He states, "The 'will' here addressed might better be described as reasoning's directedness-that which constitutes the horizon of the gaze in which judgments are made. This gaze is not just conceptual but volitional. . . . [T]he will also exacts a constant impact on the intellect by directing it in light of the good to which the will is drawn" (43). For this reason, intellectual judgment of truth cannot, ultimately, be separated from "reasoning's directness under the condition of sin" (45). Thus, his highly positive anthropology remains balanced by awareness of the need for conversion via the Christological "restoration and perfection of the image" (46) all the way to deification.
Hütter also argues in this chapter that the metaphysics of being, in order to fully differentiate beings from Being (as required by creation ex nihilo), needs the aid of the metaphysics of creation, which flows from divine revelation that culminates in Christ Jesus. Hütter explains: "While its arguments are in principle universally acceptable (assuming the absence of error), a metaphysics of creation will be less than universally acceptable, not just because philosophy is an intrinsically controversial phenomenon, but more importantly because it requires a seeing and a willing, informed by a particular practice of judgment, that is shared in only historically contingent ways" (63). The fact that theology cannot do without the metaphysics of creation (or without the metaphysics of being) makes clear that theology has not become a self-sufficient philosophical realm for prideful humans to ascend to the knowledge of God. Even those whose will has been converted and whose minds have been enlightened still experience this "under the condition of sin" (69) and therefore stand in constant need of self-emptying transformation by Christ's Cross. Yet, the highly positive valuation the power of our created rational capacities remains in place. In making this complex point, Hütter recognizes himself to be at odds with those German philosophers who sought to cut reason of from Christian faith while, at the same time, subsuming and re-casting certain fundamental aspects of faith (see 69).
The same generous optimism about human capacities, without losing awareness of human sinfulness, appears in chapter 3 on the human passions in light of the twin pitfalls of angelism and animalism. Hütter here insists upon the goodness of the passions, despite the unruliness that we experience. He emphasizes that, far from being in need of repression, the passions integrally belong to the life of virtue because they "are in potency to and indeed indispensable for a moral and spiritual formation that is integral to achieving the twofold human end" (88). In fact, according to Hütter (and Aquinas), the passions can and should be formed or habituated by human reason under the power of grace, so that they are able to contribute to the full flourishing of the human person, rather than merely leading the person astray through the violent impulses of lust, anger, fear, hunger, and so forth.
We have already seen a similar optimism in chapter 4's defense of liberalism (implicitly against the much more negative view of Hauerwas and others) as fully open to a "genuine" Christian liberalism, and therefore not necessarily productive of a "sovereign secularism"-although, in Hütter's view, liberalism becomes secularism once the connection to Christianity has been rejected. The implications for Dignitatis Humanae are clear: we need not choose between Christendom (or sectarianism) and liberalism, for there can exist a Christian liberalism. The two chap-ters (5 and 6) on the natural desire for the vision of God have been much discussed since their publication, and unsympathetic readers have sometimes construed them as a bad-old-Thomism attempt to secure Aristotelian nature at the obviously unacceptable cost of making grace irrelevant to human flourishing. Hütter, however, resists the view that grace is a mere intensification of a dynamism that already belongs to nature-and he does so not in order to remove the necessity of grace, but in order to insist upon its necessity and, indeed, upon its greatness. Our destiny is so great that not even our highest rational dynamism touches upon it, while grace utterly accords with and fulfills that highest human dynamism. Surely this is a tremendously positive portrait of the human being and human destiny, despite Hütter's point that Christian revelation does not permit us to seed human nature itself with the logic of a necessary salvation of all persons. Hütter also makes clear that the human "specific obediential potency" (177) for divinization is not a mere neutrality toward God.
The optimism of Hütter's chapter 7 on free will's non-competitive relationship with grace should already be clear, given that the alternative is the rejection of true human freedom in matters of salvation. Likewise, one can only be consoled by Hütter's dual insistence in chapter 8 that Christian faith is not reducible to a blind leap of trust taken by isolated individuals in the depths of their subjectivities and that Christian hope is not annulled by suffering, but rather goes along with it. The extraordinary optimism of Christian hope can be seen not least by contrast with contemporary culture's growing despair about death: materialist accounts of the human person can give no firm or lasting place to any object of hope, and therefore the materialist view of the human person that Hütter devotes his work to opposing is inevitably the most negative and defensive (because inhumane) view of existence.
Like Hütter's account of hope, the vision of wisdom set forth by chapters 9 and 11 is so optimistic as to be thought laughably naïve by most of Hütter's university contemporaries, perhaps especially at secular universities such as Duke. The same goes for his accounts in chapter 10 of the analogy of being and of our capacity to reason from finite effects to a transcendent cause. Rather than giving up the theological task to philosophy, Hütter makes clear that "because sacra doctrina is a subaltern scientia and as such essentially informed by the principles of the superior scientia Dei et beatorum, there is by definition no way that the analogy of being could ever determine or govern what infinitely surpasses it in dignity as well as depth" (386). Yet, lacking the ability to conceive analogously the transcendence of God, we could not receive a revelation from God, since we could literally not conceive God in any way whatsoever.
Chapter 11's reflections on wisdom and the university raise the question of whether any Catholic college or university today provides a home for the integrated quest for wisdom, which Hütter conceives primarily along Benedict Ashley's lines. In this case, Hütter's optimism leads him to propose that Thomas Aquinas College serves as a living example of the integrated quest for wisdom, although Ashley, as Hütter recognizes, insists upon the goodness of diverse intellectual disciplines and research programs (even for undergraduate institutions) in a way that Thomas Aquinas College does not.
Lastly, the very act of adoring Jesus Christ in the consecrated host-the topic of chapter 12-is surely an act of deep affirmation of the material and the human, which is only amplified by the chapter's commitment to philosophical reflection upon the Eucharistic mystery, which is therefore accessible in some way to human reason.
In short, the Christianly optimistic title, Dust Bound for Heaven, aptly describes the great themes of this book, which treats human reason and will, the passions, human sociality (in liberal democracy, in universities, in the Church, and in the task of theology), human desire for the vision of God, the human call to a supernatural destiny, the meaning of faith and hope, and Eucharistic adoration. Dust Bound for Heaven offers an extraordinarily positive vision of humans coming forth from God and being drawn up to God in the Church of Christ and in relation to other social institutions, such as the state and the university. At the same time, the book does not flinch from human fallenness. This is to say that Dust Bound for Heaven exhibits the same virtues that the Church has long found in Thomas Aquinas, and does so from within Hütter's own German and American context. Hütter's self-described "seven-yearlong journey of becoming a Catholic theologian" thereby becomes also a journey into what it means to think of God and humanity when divine revelation is read and heard through the contemporary Magisterium (here meaning mainly Pope Benedict XVI, since the book was written between 2004-2011) and through Aquinas as mediating and enriching the patristic interpretation of the Gospel.
If this splendid book could be enhanced, it would be by a more detailed and consistent introduction (or chapter 1). The introduction/ chapter 1 is admittedly the most pessimistic part of the book. Hütter encourages "a ressourcement in Thomas" but then undermines his own ability to undertake such a project by stating that such a ressourcement would require "a coherent philosophical and theological curriculum ad mentem S. Thomae, a body of teachers competent and dedicated to implement such a curriculum, gifted students dedicated to the arduous task of being 'beginners' under the tutelage of Thomas Aquinas, a way of apostolic life and witness of which study and contemplation are integral components, and last but not least an institution that enables, coordinates, and fosters such an ambitious and complex intellectual endeavor" (6). Hütter means here to be signaling the value of the renewal currently underway at the Dominican House of Studies, and he is right to do so, but the problem is that, for most young readers, the suggestion that all these things are needed in order to think with Aquinas will quite simply be too daunting and may produce an impulse to put the book down before going further. Indeed, if Hütter himself had believed that all these things were necessary before he could think ad mentem S. Thomae, he could not have written this book, because his own training and institutional contexts are largely the opposite of his description of what is ideally required for his project. The success of the book makes clear that the ongoing and utterly crucial Dominican renewal, in which Hütter participates as a Third-Order Dominican, is not the sole path by which young (or older) students of theology can find enrichment in Aquinas-as no doubt Hütter would agree.
In my view, too, the summaries of the chapters in the introduction (chapter 1) do not bring out the book's full unity or its fitting connection with Hütter's own theological journey. Furthermore, by concluding the introduction with an extensive annotated bibliography for "further explorations" in Aquinas's philosophy and theology, Hütter amplifies the sense of the arduousness of reading Aquinas and may cause introductory readers to turn back in fear that the field has already been plowed by too many brilliantly educated thinkers. My own advice would be for beginners simply to start reading Aquinas, ideally under the guidance of a teacher, and things will go well. For many readers such as Flannery O'Connor, it is immediately a pleasure to read Aquinas. For others like myself, the practice of reading him under the guidance of a teacher for a few months reveals why so many generations have found his work to be so helpful. I do not think that Hütter and I disagree in this regard, but I mention the point here in order to encourage readers to take up Dust Bound for Heaven and read the whole thing with confidence in the treasure-trove of Christian wisdom that it contains. Let me add that the bibliography that Hütter offers at the end of his introduction will certainly be of help, in due time, to the beginners who read this book and who become inspired by its powerful vision of the human journey, dust bound for heaven.
